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introduction
Corporate groups have attracted great attention in anthropology and archae-
ology since the time of Lewis Henry Morgan (1881), who tended to characterize all 
of North American traditional societies as corporate in nature. While more recent 
anthropological studies have often maintained that corporate groups are usually based 
on the control of some important resource (e.g., land, fishing sites, weirs, irrigation 
wells), much less attention has been devoted to the internal dynamics and economics 
of corporate groups. One of the more intriguing aspects of such groups has been the 
overt hostility of industrial economic leaders and ideologues toward indigenous cor-
porate groups. In a number of cases (notably in British Columbia, Indonesia, and 
Vietnam), this has even expressed itself in legal prohibitions against corporate resi-
dences and/or the prohibition of the most important corporate economic activities 
such as potlatches and similar feasts. Some anthropologists have referred to these pol-
icies as “cultural genocide” because many ritual and social practices that typify these 
ethnic groups are intimately bound to corporate group existence, including the feasts, 
ceremonies, titles, and forms of deference. Today, residential corporate groups such as 
longhouses have almost entirely been dismantled, or the economic basis of their exis-
tence has effectively been undermined by national programs or by the effects of world 
economics. Therefore, observations on the internal dynamics of corporate groups is 
largely a matter of rescue ethnography, ethnohistory, or recording oral history or 
memory culture.
Having carried out archaeological and ethnoarchaeological research among several 
corporate group societies (Hayden 1979, 2000, 2001), I have often wondered what 
internal dynamics held these multiple-family households together and what features 
in corporate group economics were so antithetical to industrialist economics (whether 
socialist or capitalist) to warrant extreme legal measures. This article presents an 
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 exploration of corporate group economic dynamics based largely on work that I 
 carried out among Southeast Asian ethnic groups. The key question to be addressed 
is: What does it mean in social and economic terms when archaeologists recover re-
mains of corporate group residences?
Definitions
Maine (1861) appears to have been the first to use the term, “corporate group,” em-
phasizing that “corporations never die” (his emphasis) and that they could have admin-
istrators. Since that time, anthropologists have adapted the term according to their 
particular interests. Thus, some definitions emphasize the durational aspects of groups, 
and other definitions emphasize the social aspects, the hereditary aspects, the legal 
aspects, or the ownership of material resources. For instance, Weber (1947 : 145ff) 
focused on the “social relationship which is either closed or limits the admission of 
outsiders by rules” as implemented by an administrative staff. Honigman (1959 : 360) 
described corporate groups as enduring, selective, and stable in membership, confer-
ring specific rights and duties, owning wealth as a group, administering discipline, 
having goals, being clearly identifiable as a group, and having clear leaders. Cochrane 
(1971) argued that the only social groups that should be termed “corporate groups” 
are those that meet the legal definition of corporate groups in Western societies. 
Nadel (1951) on the other hand viewed corporate groups as equivalent to multi-
purpose groups whose shared rights and duties become activated in diverse situations 
under the guidance of administrators. Similarly, Belshaw (1967 : 33) defined corporate 
groups as “a continuous association of roles organized to achieve common purposes,” 
with those purposes often being vague, changing, and even contradictory. For him, 
the authority of administrators might extend to joint property. Finally, Goodenough 
(1951 : 30–31) viewed corporate groups as “groups that function as individuals in rela-
tion to property,” also stressing the presence of an administrative authority. It should 
be apparent that there is no single definition of “corporate group”; however, this 
last definition probably comes closest to a useful definition for archaeologists and 
economists. This definition would eliminate many other kinds of social associations 
which Befu and Plotnicov (1962 : 314) suggest could otherwise inappropriately be 
considered as corporate groups. 
As an archaeologist, I focus on a specific kind of archaeologically visible corporate 
group: the kind that lives together under the same roof. This usage is similar to the 
general orientation of Morgan (1881) and Engels (1884) in their analysis of residential 
groups. I call these “residential corporate groups” (Hayden and Cannon 1982), but 
will often simply refer to them as “corporate groups” in the following analysis. Iden-
tifying such groups archaeologically on the basis of posthole patterns, hearths, storage 
features, or floor outlines is relatively easy. Understanding why they emerged and 
what socioeconomic dynamics held them together is more difficult, but can be aided 
by examining ethnographic cases. Some well-known examples include Iroquoian 
longhouses, Iban longhouses, Northwest Coast longhouses, and the large multifamily 
pithouses of the Northwest Interior. I explicitly exclude from this definition groups 
of people who join together for political, religious, or monetary reasons and who do 
not reside together. It makes most sense to deal with such groups as a separate ana-
lytical unit that might be referred to as an “institution.”
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Issues
There are a number of important issues concerning residential corporate groups. 
These include: 
(1)  why groups vary in size, wealth, and power; 
(2)  the roles, or functions, of corporate groups; 
(3)  the degree of control of administrators; 
(4)  whether the formation of corporate groups is fundamentally driven by commu-
nitarian interests or by the self-interests of the aggrandizer(s); 
(5)  the means by which contributions to corporate group activities are obtained from 
members; and 
(6)  the compatibility of corporate groups with Industrial economic systems. 
These issues will be addressed in the following discussions. The underlying ques-
tion of why residential corporate groups develop in some societies and not others is 
an intriguing one that has rarely been addressed by archaeologists or ethnologists. I 
will return to this question after examining some of the internal dynamics of corpo-
rate groups in relation to the other issues. However, in order to place the following 
discussions in some context, it is worth noting at this point that the major suggestions 
for causal formation factors are ownership of key resources, risk reduction strategies, 
and exploitative control over reproduction.
corporate group dynamics: degree of centralized control  
by administrators
In all cases, variations between corporate groups in power and strength appear to be 
primarily related to the size and wealth of the group, with the number and strength 
of allies within a community also playing a secondary role, together, possibly, with 
the past performance (status) of the group. When we turn to administrative control 
over corporate resources, we find that at one extreme, constituent families may oper-
ate relatively independently of each other, and the principal head of the corporate 
house seems to have relatively little control over constituent family affairs. I suspect 
that this may correspond to the development of residential corporate groups as a re-
sponse to military threats, or similar conditions that do not necessarily create strong 
means of economic control. At the other extreme, there are corporate residences 
where administrators dominate the productive activities of constituent families and 
determine how surpluses of all families are to be used. These two extremes of admin-
istrative control can be examined in more detail with the following case studies from 
Southeast Asia.
Independent Constituent Families (Decentralized Corporate Groups)
In many respects, the ethnographic work of George Condominas (1977) among the 
Monong Gar of the central Vietnamese Highlands (Fig. 1) is the most detailed account 
that exists of the traditional lives of people living in Southeast Asian longhouses. Un-
fortunately, despite all of the graphic detail that he provides, there is little discussion 
of economic production or relative allocation or control over surpluses within the 
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longhouses. Who contributes to feasts and why, for instance, is not systematically dealt 
with. However, Condominas does at least provide enough description to establish the 
fact that each family in a Monong Gar longhouse owned its own granary (built above 
its hearth area inside the longhouse) and that adjoining families in longhouses shared 
a common space between them (Figs. 2 and 3). Among the Monong Gar, there was 
no single common room for the use of the entire longhouse group. In Condominas’ 
descriptions, it further appears that each nuclear family within a longhouse (rather 
Fig. 1. Map of  Vietnam showing locations of groups mentioned in this article.
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than the longhouse as a whole) sponsored their own feasts, for which the common 
space between family areas served as the ritual center. Most families in longhouses 
(up to 40 m long with four resident families) were related, with the eldest lineage 
member serving as titular head of the longhouse. However, it is not clear what his 
responsibilities were nor what leverage he might use to obtain material contributions 
or compliance with his priorities from other member families. As in most other 
Southeast Asian groups, a large block of forest was cleared for the use of the entire 
village, and the village holy man allocated each family a section within the block for 
their own use. Poorer families complained that holy men (not, apparently, the long-
house administrative heads) put pressure on them, or coerced them to contribute to 
feasts (Condominas 1977 : 327, 333). Wealth items such as gongs were described as 
belonging to individuals rather than corporate groups (Condominas 1977 : 52). Con-
dominas’ portrayal of corporate group dynamics seems so individualistic that one 
wonders what the motivation of living communally under one roof may have been for 
families, or whether they even conformed technically to the definition of a corporate 
group. They thus appear to represent the very weak end of the corporate spectrum. 
Consistent with this view were the observations that I made when I visited several 
Monong Gar villages in 1995 with Professor Tran Quoc Vuong. These were among 
the poorest corporate groups that I observed (with dirt house floors and few wealth 
items), and they seemed to have little surplus with which to erect social networks or 
engage in much socioeconomic rivalry (Fig. 3).
I recorded a somewhat similar situation in 1996 when conducting an ethno graphic 
survey with Professor Tran Quoc Vuong in the Vietnamese Highlands of Quang Tri 
Province. The group that we visited were the Ta Oi (usually referred to as Pa Kau) 
Fig. 2. Longhouse floor plan among the Monong Gar as recorded by Condominas (1977), illustrating the 
“common” area between two family residential areas with their associated granaries in the rafters (repre-
sented by dashed-line rectangles). c = place for large jars; d = individual sleeping areas; d3 = platform for 
grain silos; e = drum; f = hearths; g = granery; h = entrances; 6 = ritual veranda.
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near Ta Rut, which had some of the longest corporate houses in Vietnam (up to 70 m 
long with 17–36 member families; Figs. 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8). Not all Ta Oi communities 
built longhouses, indicating that local environmental or economic factors probably 
played more important roles in the occurrence of longhouses than ethnic traditions. 
Unfortunately, six months before our visit, the District administration had decided 
that longhouses were a hindrance to regional economic development and had ordered 
that all longhouses be dismantled. However, due to the recentness of this change there 
Fig. 4. The exterior of a Ta Oi longhouse. (Photograph by B. Hayden)
Fig. 3. The interior of a Monong Gar longhouse showing the resident family, their eating and sleeping 
area, the elevated granary above the hearth, and the family-owned rice wine jar. Note the dirt floor 
compared to elevated floors elsewhere. (Photograph by B. Hayden)
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were a number of villages that had yet to comply with administrative policies and 
it was still possible to obtain considerable information on traditional longhouse 
 dynamics. 
Thus, we were told that the Ta Oi near Ta Rut did not use wet-rice cultivation and 
that the yields of swidden rice and maize were poor, although manioc and taro pro-
duced more. As with the Monong Gar, each family seems to have formed a relatively 
independent productive unit that prepared their own meals, cultivated their own plot 
(within the cleared village block), and owned their own field granary. However, in 
contrast to the Monong Gar, the administrative head of the corporate longhouse (dung) 
Fig. 5. An abandoned Ta Oi village and surroundings. The village was abandoned following local govern-
ment decrees banning longhouses. (Photograph by B. Hayden)
Fig. 6. The central plaza of a Ta Oi village near Ta Rut with its ceremonial sacrificial poles and one of the 
longhouses. (Photograph by B. Hayden)
Fig. 7. The village plan of a Ta Oi longhouse community illustrating the variation in longhouse lengths 
and the central plaza.
Fig. 8. Two Ta Oi house plans showing the central feasting and ritual area in each house and the division 
into family apartments.
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stored all corporate wealth in his apartment. This consisted primarily of gongs, bronze 
cauldrons, drums, wine jars, and wooden dressers.
The corporate group’s main functions were: (1) to hold feasts (see Figs. 9 and 
10); (2) to pay bride prices and reciprocal wealth exchanges between members of dif-
ferent corporate groups, especially those of high rank; (3) to cover funeral expenses 
for members; (4) to protect members involved in disputes; (5) to assure subsistence 
for members; (6) to provide for the defense of members; (7) to provide curing for 
members; (8) to worship lineage ancestors; and (9) to act as an intermediary with 
other corporate groups. Feasting, meetings, and the reception of important guests 
took place in a central “common room” (mong) within the longhouse (Figs. 8, 10, 
and 11).
Marriage was a particularly important function since marriages were used as occa-
sions for the greatest wealth exchanges in Ta Oi communities, and few if any young 
Ta Oi men could afford to underwrite marriage payments on their own (Figs. 9 and 
10). One village head told us that a normal bride price included 6 silver bracelets, 4 
pairs of earrings, 6 water buffaloes and 6 cows, 8 silver ingots, and 20–30 gongs. This 
may have been only normal for the highest ranking corporate members in recent 
times, because other accounts of marriages payments 40–50 years previous to our 
interviews recorded only one water buffalo (or a few pigs), a few gongs, one cauldron, 
and one silver ingot. Nevertheless, even these lesser amounts would have been beyond 
a young man’s means. The corporate administrator obtained marriage payment con-
tributions from all member families within the longhouse, and such demands would 
have been difficult to refuse because every member family at some time would need 
to marry their children. Similarly, funerals would have been compelling occasions for 
demanding that surpluses from longhouse member families be surrendered for corpo-
rate use. 
Fig. 9. A Ta Oi marriage feast during a daytime lull. Note the outside food preparation area in the back-
ground at right. (Photograph by B. Hayden)
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Disputes both within the community and with people in other communities were 
also very common, as Condominas (1977) amply documents. As a result, defense 
against both internal and external attacks would have been of paramount importance 
in the past. The most common causes of disputes that we recorded were adultery, wife 
Fig. 10. A Ta Oi marriage feast during intensive nighttime feasting with several hundred people crowded 
around the central ritual area of the longhouse. (Photograph by B. Hayden)
Fig. 11. The common room of a Ta Oi longhouse at A Lieng being used for a meeting with the village 
headman. (Photograph by B. Hayden)
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stealing, unreciprocated feasts or feast debts, theft (especially of animals), bets, slander 
(a serious crime in some communities), crop damage from animals, inheritances, 
moral transgressions, and sorcery. When one member of a corporate group had to pay 
for damages or fines, the entire corporate group was liable. 
It is significant that both this policy of corporate liability for members’ actions and 
the policy of arranging for marriage and funeral payments could be easily manipu-
lated to ensure, or augment, the power and leverage of corporate administrators. Thus, 
it would be in the administrators’ interests to increase all such payments to the maxi-
mum possible in order to effectively pressure corporate member families to produce 
and surrender ever greater quantities of surpluses that could be used by corporate 
administrators to increase the corporate wealth and power that they controlled. On 
the other hand, given the wealth requirements for marriage and the high probability of 
individual families being involved in disputes, it would have been in the self-interests 
of families to affiliate with as powerful and wealthy a corporate group as possible. 
Ancestor feasts would have served to enshrine administrators’ authority, while other 
feasts would have been critical in forming political alliances within and between com-
munities, as well as for attracting marriage arrangements with other powerful families 
and enhancing corporate wealth. We were told that there were both rich and poor 
families within the same longhouses, which may reflect the relative economic auto-
nomy of member families, and/or may simply reflect the various ranks within the 
corporate group—from administrators who held the corporate wealth, to other high-
ranking families, to client families, to slaves. I could obtain no indication that these 
corporate groups were land-owning descent groups. 
The Ta Oi case thus provides a less extreme example than the Monong Gar of 
relatively economically independent families who joined together to form corporate 
groups with administrative heads able to exert compelling leverage on families to pro-
duce and surrender substantial amounts of surpluses in order to carry out corporate 
functions, which all member families appear to have acknowledged as being beneficial 
or important (especially marriage, funerals, dispute resolutions, and, in the past, 
 defense against external attack). Ta Oi corporate administrators appear to have had 
significantly more control over longhouse affairs and resources than Monong Gar 
administrators and this seems reflected by the central ritual/feasting rooms and the 
substantial corporate wealth in prestige items held in those rooms.
Dependent Constituent Families: Centralized Corporate Groups
Residential corporate groups sometimes exhibit even stronger and more centralized 
degrees of control than exhibited by the Monong Gar or Ta Oi cases. The case of the 
Rhadé provides one example of corporate groups (sang) with considerable centralized 
power. Professor Tran Quoc Vuong and I visited several Rhadé communities near 
Buon Me Thuot on the central plateau of Dak Lak Province in 1995. Although there 
are a few remnant longhouse physical structures (Fig. 12), there are no functioning 
socioeconomic corporate longhouse groups left in Dak Lak Province that we know 
of, so that our information was based on memory culture and oral history. This 
area is characterized by swidden horticulture that often does not produce enough to 
meet subsistence requirements. According to informants, there was no wet-rice culti-
vation until the time of emperor Bo Dai (c. 1931–1945). Fertile, well-watered land 
would have been at a premium, and although one large block of forest was cleared for 
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cultivation by the entire village, there must have been significant variations within the 
clearing. Using iron cutting tools, one man was reported to have been able to clear a 
maximum of one half to one hectare, and this appears to have been the major con-
straint on food production. Using stone cutting tools, this constraint must have been 
greater and productivity of domesticated plant crops significantly less. Traditionally, 
we were told that all Rhadé villages were palisaded for defense and consisted of a 
number of longhouses. In contrast to the decentralized organization within Monong 
Gar longhouses, we were told that cattle and pigs (the main constituents of wealth) 
were considered the common property of the Rhadé longhouses and that these 
 animals were typically left to forage for themselves. Chickens and small pigs could be 
raised by individual families within the sang, but only with the permission of the 
 administrative head of the longhouse. 
We were also told that all produce of member families in corporate groups was 
combined and stored communally, thereby averaging individual family contributions 
to subsistence and surplus production. It is not clear from our information whether 
individual families retained any of the food that they produced, or whether a certain 
proportion of their harvests was turned over to corporate administrators, or what the 
details of any such arrangements might have been. In any case, whereas individual 
nuclear family production and surpluses might fluctuate dramatically from one year to 
another, it seems clear that the averaged production of all families in a corporate group 
would have been much more stable. Moreover, the aggregate production of surpluses 
would have been much more substantial than any individual family could have pro-
duced. We were also told that all meals were prepared at one communal hearth in the 
ok (living) section of the longhouse. Each living apartment would occupy about three 
to four meters of the length of the longhouse (Fig. 13). Feasting and rituals took place 
in one spacious common area of the longhouse (the gâh) reserved for those purposes, 
an area generally about 20–30 m long (Figs. 13 and 14). Most of the large corporate 
Fig. 12. A remnant of the longhouse founded by Me Thuot in Buon Me Thuot. Note the addition of 
modern stairs to the traditional stairs with a pair of sculpted breasts representing the matron founder of 
the longhouse. (Photograph by  B. Hayden)
hayden   .   traditional corporate group economics in southeast asia 13
wealth items were kept in the gâh, such as ceremonial benches (carved from one piece 
of wood), table-like thrones (of one piece of wood), elephant-like chairs (of one piece 
of wood), large drums, large rice wine jars, and large bronze cauldrons, gongs, and 
cymbals. Each major item of wealth required a special installation feast to validate its 
acquisition and use, and each item typically cost five or more water buffaloes to make 
Fig. 13. A Ta Oi family apartment at A Lieng. Note the paucity of material items and the presence of a 
family hearth. (Photograph by  B. Hayden)
Fig. 14. The common/ritual room of a longhouse at Buon Me Thuot (Fig. 12). Note the remaining 
major items of corporate wealth: the single-piece benches, chairs, tables, thrones, and a large drum (in the 
background at left). (Photograph by B. Hayden)
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and install. For instance, we were told that bronze gongs and cymbals cost up to six 
water buffaloes (c. US$1,200–2,400 per buffalo in 1995); bronze drums cost 600–700 
oxen in the sixth century a.d., large rice wine jars from China (similar to kraters) 
historically cost 50 oxen, while wood drums cost about US$250. Some of these may 
be exaggerated prices, but they emphasize the point that these items were very  highly 
valued.
Wealth was primarily used and displayed in feasting contexts, but was also necessary 
for settling disputes, arranging marriages, and hosting funerals or other feasts. Feasts 
operated in the same fashion as the Ta Oi to create alliances, broker marriages and 
 alliances, and promote corporate interests. The magnitude of large feasts represented 
the productive capacity and power of the corporate group. The corporate administra-
tors appear to have controlled the use of surpluses and used the need for feasts, mar-
riages, and funerals to pressure member families to produce surpluses and surrender 
produce (or at least surplus production) for the use of the administrators. Ownership 
of the longhouse together with these wealth items remained with the administrative 
title holder when individual families left the longhouse under governmental and eco-
nomic pressures. In the case of the relict longhouses that we visited, the ceremonial 
gâh area with its wealth items was still intact, although largely used for storing a vari-
ety of agricultural materials, whereas the ok living quarters had been reduced to a 
nominal apartment used by the administrative head of the sang (Fig. 14). Traditionally, 
we were told that if a family left the longhouse, they could expect no help from the 
sang. This is a feature that was confirmed in discussions with ethnologists in Hanoi as 
also important among Xo dong groups where families who left longhouses would also 
be held responsible for any misfortunes that might occur within a year, once again 
emphasizing the high degree of control that administrators could exert over member 
families. 
The benefits of belonging to longhouse corporate groups and the functions of 
these groups were essentially the same as those enumerated for the Ta Oi, although 
care of the elderly was also mentioned. The sang ensured subsistence and defended 
member interests. If an unaffiliated poor family received help from a corporate group, 
the family would become indentured to the sang. As Condominas (1977) repeatedly 
documents, poor families without the backing of powerful corporate groups often 
became targets for exploitation and were frequently enslaved by unscrupulous kin or 
community members. We recorded a number of similar instances, including a case 
where a poor person could not pay compensation to an offended family. Thus, a 
wealthy sang paid the fine for him and he became an indentured servant of the sang. 
In general, we were told that the powerful sang only paid about half of what a poor 
person would have to pay in compensations or fine, and that the rich and “honored” 
families could dominate others. Thus, according to a Rhadé aphorism, if one was 
 affiliated with a strong sang, “One will always have an ‘uncle’ (powerful defender) in 
disputes.” Corporate groups could also more easily arrange to borrow food if required 
by a series of bad harvest years.
Thus, the Rhadé case provides a good example of much stronger centralized con-
trol over nuclear family economics as expressed in administrative control over sur-
pluses and wealth, communal meal preparations, claims on family obligations even 
after leaving the longhouses, corporate ownership or control of domestic animals, and 
the ability of administrators to indenture poor families to the corporate group. The 
corporate kinship compounds around Jenné (Mali), in Africa exemplify the same cen-
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tralized dynamics with member families contributing labor and cash to the lineage 
head and preparing the large evening meal for all members (Cunningham 2009 : 279, 
285). Cash is passed to senior women who hold it cooperatively and redistribute it 
according to need. Why control appears to have been stronger and more centralized 
among the Rhadé compared to the Ta Oi or Monong Gar is difficult to determine 
especially because the basic subsistence economy seems so similar as well as funeral 
and marriage customs. Historical differences, especially involving state interference in 
sang dynamics, may have been important in weakening the centralized control of cor-
porate groups in some regions, districts, or provinces. The impacts of governmental 
legislation, governmental aid programs, governmental legal systems, the suppression 
of conflicts and slavery, legal restrictions on the land allowed to be farmed by people 
living under one roof, and the introduction of cash crops may all have been factors 
that differentially affected communities in different regions. Different effects of the 
French and American wars in Vietnam may have also played important roles. 
It is interesting that Coupland et al. (2009) posit similar variations to the centralized 
versus decentralized corporate organization described here in their “communally” 
versus “centralized” or hierarchical classification of corporate groups in the Northwest 
coastal communities in North America during the contact period with Europeans. 
On the basis of relatively limited ethnohistoric information, Coupland et al. contend 
that northern corporate groups on the Northwest Coast operated on communitarian 
principles with relatively independent constituent families, whereas they consider the 
more southern groups as more hierarchical with centralized control within residential 
corporate groups. I am skeptical of their extreme communitarian interpretations for 
some of these corporate groups, especially those in the North, where there seems to 
have been only one centralized food preparation and consumption area per structure 
that Coupland et al. interpret as evidence for communal values. Instead, on the basis 
of the Rhadé information and examples such as the groups around Jenné (Mali), I 
would argue that centralized meal preparation and consumption is more characteristic 
of centralized control over food stores and their use. The interpretation of northern 
Northwest Coast groups as highly centralized corporate groups is also consistent with 
other characterizations of these communities as more highly ranked and more hierar-
chical than southern coastal groups due to the more seasonal and time-constricted 
availability of resources in the north (Schalk 1981; Matson 1985). 
Instead of viewing residential corporate groups as fundamentally egalitarian or 
communitarian organizations, I think that corporate living generally is symptomatic 
of relatively strong socioeconomic forces implying the ability of corporate heads to 
control much if not all of the surplus wealth of the corporate group, or at least man-
date contributions from members for corporate activities (feasts, constructing build-
ings, arranging marriages, settling disputes, acquiring allies, financing raids). Without 
such strong forces, the centrifugal conflicts of interests between individuals or families 
would soon disperse members and dissolve corporate socioeconomic organizations. 
As one Rhadé man expressed it, he did not want to live in a longhouse because of the 
many disputes among members. In my ethnoarchaeological research dealing with 
corporate descent groups in Tana Toraja (Sulawesi), if members did not contribute to 
corporate (nonresidential) kindred events according to their perceived ability, they 
were deleted from corporate membership. I suspect that the same was probably 
even more true of the residential corporate longhouse groups in mainland Southeast 
Asia. 
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origins and dynamics of corporate groups
In discussions with Vietnamese ethnographers, the predominant, if not exclusive, ex-
planation for the occurrence of longhouses among some ethnic groups but not others 
was expressed in terms of cultural traditions. It was suggested that groups originating 
from or influenced by Malayo-Polynesian traditions (especially Rhadé and Girai 
speakers) lived corporately. Mon Khmer groups with longhouses such as Banar, Xo 
dong, and Halang speakers were viewed in a similar fashion, as were some Thai 
 speakers. However, this is a weak explanation from an ecological or functional per-
spective, and it does not account for the existence of longhouses in some Ta Oi com-
munities and their lack in others. Moreover, such accounts leave unanswered the 
questions of why such longhouse traditions initially emerged in these ethnic groups 
and why they should be abandoned under modern conditions, sometimes even with-
out government legislative interventions. On the basis of informants’ statements about 
the benefits and functions of corporate longhouses, I would like to suggest for proxi-
mate causes that corporate groups developed in Southeast Asia primarily either: (1) to 
reduce risks of highly variable food production; (2) to defend members from attack 
(either external physical attacks or internal political-economic attacks); or (3) to pro-
vide the necessary wealth to marry.
While corporate groups in areas like the Northwest of North America may have 
developed to control heritable resources such as ownership of prime fishing locations, 
boats, or large drying and storage facilities (Hayden 1992 : 555, 2000 : 264), these fac-
tors do not seem to have played any important role in Southeast Asia. Land was rela-
tively abundant and the use of specific plots constantly shifted as part of the swidden 
cycle. Junker (2001 : 267), Rousseau (1979a, 1979b), and Hakansson (1994, 1995) 
have similarly commented on the lack of importance of land as a factor in the creation 
of social complexity in tribal or chiefdom communities in Southeast Asia and else-
where. In addition, according to all the interview information that I was able to ob-
tain in Southeast Asia, real starvation seems to have been quite a rare occurrence due 
to the productivity of manioc and taro in the region, and due to the availability of 
backup forest foods (Hayden 2003, 2011 : 79–80). Thus, by itself, the need to reduce 
subsistence risks does not seem to be a sufficiently compelling reason for the forma-
tion of longhouse corporate groups in Southeast Asia. On the other hand, marriage 
and defense do constitute plausible forces that could drive people to abandon some 
degree of their independence and subsume their immediate nutritional self-interests 
under the  broader interests of a corporate organization and its administrators. Given 
these postulates, the ultimate causes for the emergence of corporate longhouses in 
Southeast Asia can be viewed either as a communitarian pooling of interests or as a 
more exploitative strategy on the part of aggrandizing individuals to promote their 
own self-interests and their acquisition of power. 
Anecdotally, it is interesting that the Akha, among whom I also worked, had very 
little in the way of bride prices or arranged marriages, and they also lacked corporate 
longhouses. In contrast, the Ta Oi and Rhadé had exorbitant bride prices as well as 
constant litigations between families. I suggest that these conditions and traditions 
could easily be introduced and promoted by manipulative individuals under appropri-
ate surplus producing conditions. As the most expensive events in a family’s history, 
bride prices or funeral costs may provide a proxy measure of the levels of surpluses that 
could be produced by families in specific communities—although this leads to some-
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what circular inferences. High bride prices were certainly not to the advantage of 
the average individual seeking to be married, nor were arranged marriages to their 
advantage either. Thus one may ask: Who promoted these high bride prices and 
 arranged marriages? They do not seem to have developed from communitarian con-
cerns. Meillassoux (1981) has argued that the only people in Africa that high bride 
prices benefit are the wealthy and those people seeking power over junior members 
of their communities. The need to pay high prices for marriages certainly creates a 
compelling reason for producing and surrendering surpluses. Defense from external 
attack and the need for allies may have been an equally compelling reason for corpo-
rate group formation in the past, and it could also have been easily manipulated by 
aggrandizers to their advantage or to force people into joining corporate groups dom-
inated by ambitious administrators (e.g., Sillitoe 1978). 
It seems that the most favorable ecological conditions for establishing cultural prac-
tices that can be used to manipulate others (like high marriage prices or feasting debts) 
are in situations where it is possible to at least intermittently produce enough sur-
pluses to sustain high prices for marriages or litigations, but not conditions where 
large surpluses can be reliably produced by nuclear families (as is often the case with 
wet-rice agriculture or cash cropping). Where nuclear families can control their own 
means of production and reliably produce surpluses, they can be expected to govern 
their own affairs and operate as relatively independent economic and political units 
(barring external threats). This is typically what happens today when nuclear families 
can obtain better and more reliable incomes from salaried positions or farming cash 
crops. These families usually rapidly sever their ties with social groups trying to access 
and use their incomes. Further support for this model is provided by Lemmonier’s 
(1990 : 23fn) observation that the “fringe Highlands” of New Guinea were char-
acterized by low population densities (hence low agricultural productivity) and long-
houses, in contrast to the individual nuclear family houses and extraordinary population 
densities for many swidden agriculturalists in the Highlands proper. Thus, it would 
seem that the intermediate and highly variable levels of surplus production are those 
most favorable for the development of high marriage prices and consequently make it 
possible for manipulative individuals to engineer the creation of corporate groups. To 
this proximate core function of corporate groups, many other reinforcing strategies 
might be added, such as dispute protection, reduction of subsistence risks, provision 
for funeral expenses (which could also be artificially inflated), and various “needs” to 
honor or appease the corporate ancestors.
Once ambitious individuals obtained a toehold in promoting their values and cor-
porate types of organization, corporate heads could exert more influence to invest 
surpluses according to their own interests and, to the extent necessary, the interests of 
their support group. They could prevail upon corporate members to make contribu-
tions for the “necessary” costs of obtaining and installing corporate wealth, holding 
funerals, securing allies, hosting promotional feasts to attract desirable marriage part-
ners, preparing feasts to placate ancestors, and so on. As a result, there could be con-
stant pressure on many corporate members from high-ranking members to produce 
ever more and to contribute greater and greater quantities of resources to corporate 
coffers. This socioeconomic badgering by big men and chiefs is graphically illustrated 
in the ethnographic films Ongka’s Big Moka and The Kirghiz of Afghanistan. However, 
typically, lower ranking members in corporate groups do not directly (and then 
only paternalistically) benefit from increased production, or they benefit less than 
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high-ranking members who have titles and ownership status. Unless they are ambi-
tious or anxious about their security, lower ranking members should generally ex-
hibit considerable reluctance to increase production beyond basic subsistence needs, 
as postulated by Sahlins (1959). In most administratively centralized corporate groups, 
I suggest that the surplus production efforts of the rank and file largely benefit other 
higher ranking individuals or the corporate group as a whole. It is incumbent on 
high-ranking administrators to find ways to convince low-ranking families to produce 
and surrender surpluses and that it is in the members’ ultimate interest to do so. 
relationships with industrial economies
This situation is perhaps not conceptually very different from the relationship be-
tween Industrial workers and corporate owners. However, in the Industrial context, 
if a worker spends more time working, he or she will earn more money, thereby in-
creasing their spending ability. Their productive efforts can directly benefit themselves. 
This is not necessarily the case in traditional subsistence-based corporate groups, 
where most, if not all, prestige items are limited to the corporate leaders or the group 
as a whole and any benefits from increased production of individuals are delayed and 
channeled through the administrative gatekeepers of the corporate groups.
Thus, as Sahlins (1959) argues for subsistence domestic economies in general, in 
traditional corporate groups, there is little direct or immediate-return individual in-
centive to increase production, and individuals have little purchasing power (or the 
equivalent in non-monetary systems). In order to maximize production and con-
sumption, industrialism’s underlying goal is to promote individual incentives by en-
suring that individuals can benefit directly, and with minimal delays, from their 
Fig. 15. A similar, more actively used, common/ritual room among the Monong Ralam with corporate 
wealth in the form of massive wood benches, tables, thrones, ceramic rice wine jars, a bronze cauldron 
(in the left foreground), and a central hearth. (Photograph by B. Hayden)
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productive efforts. The extreme expression of this strategy is today’s highly individual-
ized urban Industrial societies. The underlying ideological premise is that increased 
work will increase self-benefits. Therefore large proportions of populations willingly 
support such systems and willingly work far more than might be required for simple 
subsistence needs.
In contrast, traditional economies—whether organized corporately or by nuclear 
family households—demand substantial contributions of surpluses from families in 
order to underwrite feasts, rituals, and displays calculated to create political and eco-
nomic networks that only become critical for survival or reproduction episodically 
and frequently for the benefit of other corporate or community members rather than 
for individual contributors. For the average person in an average year, membership in 
traditional corporate and feasting groups probably entailed the production and sur-
render of significant amounts of surplus. The motivation for contributing to tradi-
tional, especially corporate, systems is the relatively indirect and delayed ability to 
access personal security, subsistence security, and reproductive security, or, for the 
ambitious, the potential to occupy positions of increased power. Despite these con-
straints, the magnitude of surpluses marshaled for corporate events could be impres-
sive (Fig. 16), indicating the influence of strong pressures or motivations on corporate 
or community memberships. However, the details of how pressures are marshaled to 
leverage surpluses and labor from memberships in traditional systems are typically 
implicit or covert due to the manipulative psychological tactics often employed by 
aggrandizers to achieve their goals. Thus, information about such dynamics is often 
lacking from ethnographies (although see Reay 1959 and Sillitoe 1978).
By breaking up corporate groups, Industrialists force families to become much 
more economically independent, thus providing much greater incentives for large 
proportions of the population to increase production and to increase their purchasing 
Fig. 16. An example of the large surpluses that can be obtained from corporate members for corporate 
events such as this funeral among the Torajans in Sulawesi. Such events can involve dozens or scores of 
water buffaloes, pigs, and other animals. (Photograph by Michael Clarke)
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potential and self-benefits. In addition to the apparent economic “waste” of feasts 
(diverting potential capital away from banks, business ventures, or investments), I sug-
gest that the low productive incentives for families in residential corporate groups are 
one of the main ideological reasons why traditional corporate groups have almost 
universally come under attack or been prohibited by Industrial nation-states (whether 
capitalist, socialist, or communist) as economically retrogressive and detrimental to 
national economic progress. 
In addition to these factors there is another consideration. Ultimately, the amount 
of surplus that can be extracted from individual families in subsistence economies is 
finite, and therefore there must be competition between various administrative levels 
to appropriate as much of that surplus as possible for themselves. Corporate groups 
essentially constitute a level of administration that must compete for surpluses with 
local, regional, and national levels of administration. In traditional tribal villages, cor-
porate groups monopolized almost all surplus production above nuclear family needs, 
and constituted the most important administrative level besides the relatively loosely 
organized village administrations. In Industrial nation contexts, regional and national 
administrations require very large surplus inputs that are simply not possible to sustain 
where corporate groups divert almost all surpluses for their own local uses. Thus, 
wherever environments have been rich enough to support national governments, 
corporate groups have eventually been driven out of existence. It is possible that early 
state forms may have incorporated local corporate groups into their administrative 
framework to act as local administrative agents and tribute collectors. However, more 
advanced state organizations such as those that extended their control throughout 
much Southeast Asia in the first millennium a.d. probably sought to eliminate and 
replace local corporate groups with their own national versions of administration that 
were easier to influence and control. Prior to that time, residential corporate groups 
may have been much more widespread in Southeast Asia, notably in the Neolithic and 
Metal Ages.
Thus, corporate groups have been largely driven out of existence today due to 
ideological incompatibilities with Industrial economies, due to direct competition 
with regional and national administrations for uses of surpluses, and due to the usur-
pation by regional and national governments of many corporate functions such as 
defense, dispute resolution, health, and subsistence security. Today, traditional corpo-
rate groups only appear to exist in the most remote parts of the most underdeveloped 
nations such as Laos and Indonesia. As these nations become increasingly involved in 
world economies, corporate groups there are certain to disappear. While I have con-
centrated on corporate groups in transegalitarian societies, it is also interesting to note 
that they probably also existed in some traditional state-level organizations such as the 
corporate craft organizations of  Teotihuacan and some of the elite corporate kinship 
of the Maya (probably controlling trade and intensive agriculture-Schele and Friedel 
1990 : 84–87, 93–94). These may exhibit some different dynamics and organizational 
characteristics from transegalitarian subsistence-based societies. But this is a topic for 
future exploration. 
Whether a form of traditional corporate group organization (and the traditional 
culture associated with corporate groups) can be retained within an Industrial context 
is an open question. I would suggest that to satisfy all interests, any such traditional 
corporate group would have to be regulated in such a way that some portion of cor-
porate surpluses was returned to individual families for their own discretionary use, 
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while some portion of the surplus was also retained for corporate use in the form of 
an internal tax. Whether this would be operationally practical is another question 
since many families would undoubtedly view this as an unnecessary level of addi-
tional taxation (beyond local and state taxes). If some such accommodation cannot be 
achieved, the future of subsistence-based corporate group organizations appears bleak 
indeed.
summary
Residential corporate groups are archaeologically visible social groups that provide a 
number of possibilities for understanding the socioeconomic dynamics and character-
istics of past societies. On the basis of ethnographic examples, it can be expected that 
prehistoric corporate groups probably varied in their degree of internal centralized 
control. The degree of centralized control may be reflected archaeologically in terms 
of the distribution of hearths (central vs. one for each family), storage areas, central-
ized ritual/feasting areas, and levels of corporate wealth (frequency and size of domes-
tic animals, wealth items, size of pots). Given inevitable disputes in any large groups 
of people and desires of most families to live independently, it can be assumed that 
special conditions led to the formation of residential corporate groups, particularly the 
larger examples. I suggest that defense against physical and socioeconomic attacks 
constituted one condition, while the manipulation of these matters as well as of mar-
riage prices by self-serving aggrandizers pressured other community members to 
agree to corporate group life under the aegis of aggrandizer individuals. Under mod-
erate and variable surplus producing environments, members produced and surren-
dered surpluses in order to be assured of enough resources to be married, properly 
buried, and protected in litigations. Land ownership does not appear to have been a 
basis for corporate group formation in Southeast Asia, although, it may have been 
elsewhere. Due to competition for the control of surpluses, corporate group dynamics 
in Southeast Asia appear to be fundamentally incompatible with state organizations 
except as administrative means of controlling remote areas. This explains why indus-
trial nations have generally tried to undermine or even outlaw residential corporate 
groups and their major feasting activities.
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abstract
From the late nineteenth century to the present, social scientists and archaeologists have 
been intrigued by village-level corporate groups living under a single roof. Yet remark-
ably little is known ethnographically about the internal economic and social dynamics 
of these groups or why such groups emerge at certain time periods or places. My re-
search focuses on some of the last indigenous corporate groups in mainland Southeast 
Asia. I document the advantages corporate organizations provide for members (mainly 
risk reduction), the high costs often involved for members, the range of status and wealth 
within such groups, and the probable motivations of individuals for organizing corporate 
groups. I contrast the communitarian models with aggrandizer models for the creation 
of corporate groups, but note considerable variability within the corporate residential 
phenomenon. I postulate that residential corporate groups were probably much more 
widespread in the Neolithic and Metal Ages of Southeast Asia than historically was the 
case. Keywords: corporate groups, longhouses, Southeast Asia, archaeology, ethnogra-
phy, economics, social evolution.
